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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
STATE OF UTAH

PAUL ARGUELLO,
Plaintiff and Appellant, ]
i
]

vs.
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING
MACHINE COMPANY, INC.,

Case No.

910046

Priority Classification:

16

]

Defendant and Apellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACHINE COMPANY, INC.

JURISDICTION
This court has jursidiction over this case under Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2-(3) (j) (1987).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did Mr. Arguello's claim "arise from" Industrial

Woodworking Machine Company, Inc.'s ("IWM Co.") conduct toward
Utah as required by Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-24 (1987)?

Pre-trial jurisdictional decisions based on

documentary evidence are reviewed de novo by appellate courts.
Anderson v. Am. Soc. of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 8 07
P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990).
2.

Did the trial court err in ruling that defendant

and appellee, IWM Co., did not have the necessary minimum

contacts with Utah to allow Utah courts to acquire personal
jursidiction over IWM Co.?

Pre-trial jursidiction decisions

based on documentery evidence are reviewed de novo by appellate
courts.

Id.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24.
Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts submitting
person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this
state, who in person or through an agent does any
of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state as to any claim arising from:
. . .

(3)

the causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty...

U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from an

order of the lower court (R.74) dismissing Mr. Arguello's
complaint based on IWM Co.'s lack of sufficient minimum
contacts with Utah necessary to subject IWM Co. to the
personal jurisdiction of this forum.
-2-

B.

Disposition of the Case Below,

Mr. Arguello

commenced this action by filing a complaint against IWM Co.
seeking damages for personal injuries.

(R.l).

IWM Co. then

filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on this
forum's lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R.44).

Both parties

submitted memoranda in support of their positions regarding IWM
Co.'s motion.

Judge David E. Roth thereafter granted IWM Co.'s

motion to dismiss.

(R.74).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Mr. Arguello brought this action against IWM Co. based
on personal injuries that allegedly occurred when he operated a
used finger jointing machine that originally had been
manufactured by IWM Co.

The plaintiff's alleged injuries

occurred in July of 1987 while he was working for
Weathershield, Inc., of Logan Utah.

The finger jointing

machine, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-4-10771 (hereinafter simply "the
machine") originally had been built for and sold to Pickering
Lumber Co. ("Pickering") located in Standard, California in
1971.

(Affidavit of Gale Y. Cromeens,fllO,R.18-20).

The

invoice of the sale to Pickering (attached to Cromeens'
affidavit as Exhibit "A", R.21-23) shows that the machine
contained numerous additions and appears to have been custom
made to Pickering's specifications.
1971 was $81,473.50.

(R.23).

The cost of the machine in

In addition, the invoice reveals

that Pickering was charged $4,073.68 in state sales tax,
-3-

another indication that Pickering was the intended end user.
(R.23).
In July of 1982, Weathershield contact IWM Co. and
requested that IWM Co. send a service representative to examine
certain machinery in Utah that Weathershield somehow had
acquired.

(Cromeens affidavit at flO, R.18-20).

This was the

only occasion during the last nine years when IWM Co. has sent
a service representative to Utah.

(Cromeens affidavit, flO, R.

20) .
The service representative found that the machine had
been substantially modified during the ten-year period since it
had left IWM Co.'s possession .

(R.19).

Specifically, the lug

system had been modified causing the wood to pop out.

(R.19).

The service representative advised Weathershield that the
modifications needed to be corrected before the machine would
work properly.

(R.19).

Most importantly, the service

representative did not perform any service or work on the
machine.

(R.19).

He merely responded to Weathershield7s

inquiry comcerning the operation of the machine.
affidavit, f10, R. 18-19).

(Cromeens

There is no evidence that the

service representative was requested by Weathershield to
perform repairs or otherwise work on the machine.
IWM Co.'s contacts with Utah are few, insubstantial
and totally unrelatd to plaintiff's claimed injuries.
maintains no office in Utah.
employed personnel in Utah.

(R.17).

IWM Co.

IWM Co. has never

(Cromeens affidavit fl5, R.17).
-4-

IWM Co. sends no sales personnel to Utah to market its
products.

(R.17).

The only advertising done by IWM Co. which

may or may not have reached Utah has consisted of occasional
small advertisements placed in four national trade
publications.

(R.17-18).

None of these advertisements dealt

with machinery of the type which allegedly injured the
plaintiff.

(Cromeens affidavit, f6, R.17-18).

IWM Co.'s sales

to Utah during each of the last nine hears have averaged
$13,153.00, a figure that represents approximately three-tenths
of one percent (0.3%) of IWM Co.'s total sales volume.
(Cromeens affidavit, f3, R.17).

In contrast, this average

annual sales figure amounts to less than one-sixth of the sales
price of the single finger joint machine sold to Pickering
Lumber in 1971.
The products sold by IWM Co. to Utah have consisted
primarily of parts, not equipment, and have resulted from Utah
customers calling IWM Co. to order its products.

(Cromeens

affidavit, f4, R.17).

IWM Co. generally sells directly to the

user of its products.

(R.18).

IWM Co. has not attempted to

market its products in this state or to place its products into
a distribution newtork or "stream of commerce" designed to
carry IWM Co.'s products here.
R.18).

(Cromeens affidavit., 57,

IWM Co. has no history of utilizing Utah's court system

or other services.

(Cromeens affidavit, f8, R.18).

In short,

IWM Co. possesses few contacts with this state and those
contacts are totally unrelated to plaintiff's alleged injuries.
-5-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
IWM CO. does not have substantial connections with
Utah.

Mr. Arguello, accordingly, has based his jurisdictional

claim on Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24.
However, because Mr. Arguello7s claims do not "arise from" IWM
Co.'s few, minor connections with this state, the long-arm
statute fails as a basis for Utah's exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
Similarly, IWM Co. does not possess sufficient minimum
contacts with Utah such that this forum's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over IWM Co. would satisfy the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

IWM

Co. has very few connections with this state and these have
resulted from Utah residents reaching out to IWM Co. in Texas.
IWM Co. does not target Utah to sell or distribute its
products, or otherwise take advangage of the benefits and
protections of this state.

Plaintiff's claims are not related

to, nor do they arise from, any IWM Co. activity directed
toward this forum.
Finally, the machine that injured plaintiff was not
placed into the "stream of commerce" for ultimate distribution
to Utah.

Nor does IWM Co. utilize a distribution network that

targets this state.

IWM Co. sold the machine for use in

California and did not participate in or facilitate the
machine's removal to Utah.

Therefore, IWM Co. has insufficient

minimum contacts with Utah, either direct or indirect, to
-6-

satisfy the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment and
the decison of the trial court should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
The legitimate exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant based on Utah's long-arm statute
requires that two criteria be satisfied.

First, the

defendant's conduct must fall within the ambit of the long-arm
statute as contained in Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24.

Second, the

defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
such that maintenance of a suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice within the
constraints of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).
Neither of these criteria are satisfied in the instant action.
The only evidence submitted in the proceedings below
were the affidavit of Gale Y. Cromeens (R.16-20) and the
exhibits attached thereto (R.21-26) submitted by IWM Co. Mr.
Arguello did not contest this evidence nor submit any
countering affidavits, exhibits or other evidence.
Accordingly, this court's review of the trial court's decision
is limited to the evidence contained in the Cromeens affidavit
and its supporting exhibits.

See Roskellv & Co. v. Lerco,

Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980).

The affidavit and

exhibits are attached to this brief as Addendeum 1.
-7-

I.

MR. ARGUELLO'S CLAIM DID NOT "ARISE FROM"
IWM CO.'S CONDUCT TOWARD THE FORUM AS
REQUIRED BY UTAH'S LONG-ARM STATUTE.

The relevant provision of Utah's long-arm statute
relied upon by Mr. Arguello to assert jurisdiction over IWM Co.
explicitly provides that the plaintiff's claim must "arise
from" the defendant's causing of injury within the state.

Utah

Code Ann. §78-27-24 (3). The Utah Supreme Court explained the
criteria that must be met to satisfy the "arising from"
provision of Utah's long-arm statute in Roskelly & Co. v.
Lerco, Inc.. P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1980) as follows:
[I]f the action is brought pursuant to the
long-arm statute because defendant is not doing
substantial business in the forum state,
plaintiff must show that his claim arises out of
some contact defendant has with the forum state,
some action undertaken by defendant by which it
can be shown that defendant has in fact
"purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state" and
it does not here assist the plaintif to show the
contacts defendant has with the forum, if the
specific litigation at bar does not arise out of
those contacts.
Id.

(citations omitted) (emphasis in original text).
This view is consistent with the requirement

established by the United States Supreme Court that the cause
of action must "arise out of" the defendant's activities toward
the forum state to satisfy due process considerations unless
the defendant has substantial ties to the forum.
v.

See Hansen

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 789 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d

1283 (1958).
follows:

One commentator has summarized this concept as

"The United Staes Supreme Court has used the arising
-8-

out of concept to describe siutations where the plaintiff's
claim came into existence as a result of, and bears a close
relationship to, the non-resident defendant's foreign-state
activities."

Strachan, In Personum Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977

Utah L. Rev. 235, 253; see Hansen v. Denckla. 357 U.S. at
251-53, 78 S.Ct. at 1237, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1296-98.
In the case at bar, Mr. Arguello's claim is totally
unrelated to any IWM Co. activity directed toward Utah.

The

machine was custom manufactured for use by a California lumber
company and was not sold for distribution here.

(R.18).

Similarly, the machine was not advertised in Utah or in any
publications that could reach Utah.

(R.17-18).

IWM Co.'s few

small advertisements in national trade magazines involved
entirely different products.

(R.18).

IWM Co. was not

responsible for the machine's entry into Utah and is unaware
how it came into Weathershield's possession here.

(R.19).

During the service representative's sole visit here nine years
ago, he merely advised Weathershield to correct modifications
that had been made to the machine since it had left IWM Co.'s
control

(R.19).

He performed no work on the machine, nor is

there any evidence that he was requested to do so by
Weathershield.

(R.19).

In short, Mr. Arguello's alleged injuries simply did
not arise from IWM Co.'s activities in Utah within the meaning
of the long-arm statute.

His injuries did not come into

existence as a result of, or bear a close relationship to, IWM
-9-

Co.'s conduct in or toward Utah.

Therefore, Mr. Arguello may

not assert the long-arm statute as a basis for jurisdiction.
II. IWM CO. DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT MINIMUM
CONTRACTS TO SUBJECT IT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IN UTAH.
A.

IWM Do. does not have sufficient direct
minimum contacts wth Utah to enable this
forum to assert jurisdiction.

The due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution requires that a non-resident
defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state such that the defendant should "reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."

World-wide Volkswagen v.

Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 295-298, 100 S. Ct. 559, 556-67 62
L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

The defendant must have "purposefully

availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state."

Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 779 P.2d

659, 662 (Utah 1989) (quoting Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at
253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d. at 1298).

The relationship

of the defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other is
central to this inquiry.

Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching

Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985).

Specifically, the cause

of action should arise out of or have a substantial connection
with the defendants activity in the forum (as discussed in
Section I above).

In addition, any balancing of the

convenience of the parties and interests of the state should
weigh in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction before due
process concerns are satisfied.

See Mallory Engineering v. Ted

-10-

R. Brown & Assocs., 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1029, 101 S.Ct. 602, 66 L.Ed.2d 492 (1980).
The application of these due process requirements can
best be seen by analyzing relevant case law.

A case closely

analogous to the instant action was addressed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d
440, 447 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 75 U.S. 1082, 106 S.
Ct. 853 (1986), which required an analysis of Utah personal
jurisdiction law in a products liability setting.

In

Philadelphia Resins, the manufacturer of synthetic fiber cable
was sued for injuries sustained when a cable attached to a
helicopter broke resulting in substantial damage to the
equipment.

The cable had been sold to an Arkansas helicopter

pilot who ordered it prior to coming to Utah to perform a
delivery contract.

The pilot had read about the cable in a

national trade publication.

The pilot ordered it specifically

for use in performing the contract in the Rocky Mountan region
and so informed an employee of the manufacturer.

The defendant

manufacturer had sold its products in all fifty states,
including Utah, but between 1978 and 1980 the defendant's sales
to Utah amounted to approximately one tenth of one percent
(0.1%) of the defendant's gross sales volume.
In a thorough, carefully reasoned opinion that
examined the development of the constitutional due process
requirements of personal jurisdiction, the court held that
-11-

because it was never specifically foreseeable that the cable
was destined for the Utah market, the defendant lacked the
necessary minimum contacts with the forum for Utah to exercise
personal jurisdiction.

The court stated:

If a defendant's product comes into the forum
state as a result of deliberate, although perhaps
indirect, effort of the defendant to serve the
forum state's market, then that defendant is
subject to jurisdiction there. Placing one's
product into the "stream of commerce11 with the
expectation of distribution into particular areas
is the classic example of such an indirect
effort. If, however, the defendant's product
comes into the forum state as a result of the
actions of an unconnected third party, or of
fortuitous events over which the defendant has no
control, then the defendant is not subject to
jurisdiction in the forum state.
Id. at 446.
Philadelphia Resins provides a similar fact pattern to
the case at bar concerning the defendant's contacts to the
forum.

In the instant case, IWM Co.'s sales to Utah have

amounted to approximately three tenths of one percent (0.3%) of
its gross sales over the last nine years.

(R.17).

The

majority of these sales have involved parts and have been
unrelated to the machinery that allegedly injured the
plaintiff.

(R.17).

The few sales that have occurred in Utah

have been initiated by Utah customers and have not occurred
through IWM Co.'s efforts to sell its products here.

(R.17).

The machine that allegedly injured the plaintiff was
originally built for and supplied to a California lumber
company approximately 16 years prior to the time when the
plaintiff claims to have been injured.

(R.19).

The machine

had not been placed into the stream of commerce for
distribution or resale here.

The machine was modified and came

to Utah solely through the actions of unconnected third parties
or fortuitous events over which the defendant had no control.
Indeed, IWM Co. actually had considerably less
opportunity to foresee that the product in question would be
used in Utah than did the defendant in Philadelphia Resins.
Unlike the cable manufacturer, IWM Co. had not advertised the
product in question in national trade publications and IWM
Co.'s employees had no knowledge that the particular product
possibly would be used here by the buyer.

Therefore, the

instant action actually provides a much stronger case for
dismissal than that described in Philadelphia Resins.

See

also, Jones v. North American Aerodynamics Co., Inc., 594
F.Supp. 657 (D.Maine 1984).
The court in Philadelphia Resins also emphasized the
importance of the cause of action arising from the defendant's
conduct toward the forum.

The court indicated "the instant

cause of action arose, ultimately, from PRC's successful
advertising efforts in Arkansas, together with the fortuitous
transport of a PRC product into Utah; not from any effort PRC
may have made to sell its products in Utah or to transport its
product into Utah."

Philadelphia Resins. 766 F.2d. at 446.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff's alleged injuries
simply did not arise from the defendant's activities in Utah.
Any injuries arose, ultimately, from a third party's
-13-

modification of a machine that originally had been sold for use
in California.

The machine's fortuitous transport to Utah was

totally unrelated to IWM Co.'s nominal contacts with this state.
The sole connecton between the defendant's activities
in Utah and the machine that allegedly caused plaintiff's
injury was the single visit here nine years ago by an IWM Co.
service representative that looked, and only looked, at the
machine.

The representative did not perform service,

maintenance or repairs on the machine and was not requested to
do so by Weathershield.

(R.19).

The representative merely

informed Weathershield that the machine had been modified by
others since leaving IWM Co.'s plant and that these
modifications were causing the problems with the machine.
(R.19).

In no possible sense can the plaintiff's injuries be

construed as "arising out of" the service representative's
visit and the plaintiff's complaint does not so allege.
Contrary to plaintiff's implications, the representative had
neither the duty, nor even the right, to work on the machine
without a contract to do so with Weathershield.
If the representative had performed service on the
machine and the plaintiff was injured as a result of the
representative's repairs, then perhaps the required nexus
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries
would be present.

However, because the defendant did

absolutely nothing concerning the machine other than inform
Weathershield that modifications made on the machine were
-14-

causing a problem, there remains no connection between the
plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's limited activities in
this state.
Therefore, the constitutionally mandated nexus between
the plaintiff's claimed injuries and the defendant's contacts
with Utah remains unsatisfied by the facts of this case.

The

due process requirements of the 14th Amendment mandate that Mr.
Arguello's suit be dismissed.
B.

IWM Co. has not indirectly established
minimum contacts with Utah by placing the
finger joint machine into the stream of
commerce.

Plaintiff mischaracterizes this case as involving
stream of commerce issues.

Stream of commerce is a "term used

to describe goods which remain in interstate commerce though
held within a state for a short period of time.

If such goods

remain in the stream of commerce, they are not subject to local
taxation."

Black's Law Dictionary, 1921 (6th ed. 1990).

The

term implies the flow of goods through a distribution system
between a manufacturer and the ultimate retail purchaser of the
goods.

As Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion in

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117,
107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92, 107 (1987), "[t]he stream of
commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies but to
the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacturer
to distribution to retail sale."
In the instant action, the machine clearly was not
-15-

placed into the stream of commerce.

It was sold and delivered

directly to the intended user, Pickering Lumber Co., in
(R.18-19).

California

The machine appears to have been custom

made for Pickering and Pickering was charged sales tax, further
indicating that Pickering was the intended user of the
machine.

(R.21-23).

Similarly, IWM Co. generally sells all

its products directly to the user rather than through any
distribution network.

(R.18).

In short, there has been no

regular or anticipated flow of IWM Co.'s products from
manufacturer to distribution to retail sale in Utah.
Accordingly, the use of the stream of commerce theory is an
inappropriate basis to analyze this case.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Arguello apparently concedes
that the machine was manufactured and sold for use by Pickering
Lumber Co. in California.

(Appellants brief at 5).

Mr.

Arguello has not asserted that the machine originally was
intended for resale by Pickering to Utah, nor would the
evidence support such an assertion.
Rather, Mr. Arguello argues that because the machine
originally cost $85,000.00 it was foreseeable that the machine>
eventually would be resold as used equipment in Utah.

He

apparently asserts that the foreseeability of the machined
possible resale as used equipment provides for personal
jurisdicton under a stream of commerce theory.
brief at 9.

Appellant's

This premise totally lacks any foundation in

evidence or logic and is contrary to controlling case law.
-16-

Mr. Agruello failed to introduce any evidence in the
proceedings below showing the existence of a secondary market
or indicating that it was likely or even foreseeable that the
machine would be resold in Utah.

He also failed to show why an

$85,000.00 finger jointing machine was likely to find its way
into another state, particularly Utah, simply based on its
cost.

Logic would dictate that a custom built machine

manufactured for use by a California lumber company likely
would remain with the lumber company throughout the machine's
useful life.
Even assuming that it was foreseeable that the machine
eventually could be sold as used equipment in another state,
case law clearly has established that this type of
foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient bench mark for
personal jurisdiction under the due process clause.

World-wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. at 296-97, 62 L.Ed.2d at
500-01.

The plaintiff's usage of "foreseeability" stretches

its meaning to the point where all manufacturers would be
amenable to suit wherever their products happened to go
throughout the products' existence.

The United States Supreme *

Court has specifically rejected such a meaning of
foreseeability as satisfying the due process requirements for
personal jurisdiction.

In World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

Woodson, the court stated:
If foreseeability were the criterion [for
asserting personal jurisdiction], . . . every
seller of chattels would in effect appoint the
-17-

chattel his agent for service of process. His
amenability to suit would travel with the
chattel. We recently abandoned the outworn rule
of Harris v. Balk, that the interest of a
creditor in a debt could be extinguished or
otherwise affected by any state having transitory
jurisdiction over the debtor. Having interred
the mechanical rule that a creditor's amenability
to a quasi in rem action travels with his debtor,
we are unwilling to endorse an analogous
principle in the present case. . . .
The foreseeability that is critical to due
process analysis is not the mere likelihood that
a product will find its way into the forum
state. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.
Id.

(citations omitted).

In the present case, Mr. Arguello's

assertion that IWM Co.'s amenability to suit traveled with the
finger jointing machine based on the machine's $85,000.00 cost
obviously is contrary to the guidelines established above by
the United States Supreme Court.
It simply was not foreseeable, as that term applies in
due process analysis, that the machine would end up in Utah
subjecting IWM Co. to suit here.

It was not foreseeable

because IWM Co's conduct in selling the machine or in otherwise
establishing connections with Utah were not such that IWM Co.
should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court
here.

Accordingly, Mr. Arguello's stream of commerce theory

has no basis in fact or law and is inappropriate to the present
action.
Even assuming, arguendo, that this case involved
stream of commerce considerations, IWM Co. still would not be
-18-

subject to suit here under Utah law.

In the recent case of

Parry v. Ernst Home Center. 779 P.2d. 659 (Utah 1989), this
court held that a Japanese manufacturer and a Japanese
distributor of a maul that allegedly had caused injury to a
Utah plaintiff were not subject to this state's personal
jurisdiction.

The maul originally was sold by a retailer in

Idaho to a customer that had given it to her father in Utah.
The Japanese defendants had dealt primarily with a California
distributor, although they were informed of potential sales
throughout the western United States.

The Utah Supreme Court

held that:
[A]n intentional and knowing distribution of the
product in the western United States is not
necessarily sufficient to satisfy the "minimum
contacts" requirement. . . . Without a showing of
"additional conduct," we are unable to find that
the eventual sale of a product in Utah justifies
personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 667.
In the instant action, the case against asserting
personal jurisdiction over IWM Co. is much stronger than
existed in Parry because IWM Co. had no knowledge that its
product might be resold and used in Utah.

Therefore, even if a

stream of commerce theory is applied to the facts of this case,
controlling case law mandates that Utah may not exercise
personal jurisdiction over IWM Co. because IWM Co. has not
established sufficient minimum contacts wth this forum.

The

District Court's dismissal of Mr. Arguello's suit based on the
-19-

lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, accordingly,
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
IWM Co. has engaged in very few, insubstantial
contacts with the State of Utah.

Accordingly, Mr. Arguello's

alleged injuries must arise from those contacts before a basis
exists for this forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over
IWM Co. under either Utah's long-arm statute or the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment.

The alleged injuries, however,

were caused by a machine that was built for and sold to a
California lumber company by IWM Co. approximately 16 years
prior to the time of Mr. Arguello's alleged mishap.

IWM Co.

participated in no activity that facilitated either the
machine's fortuitous transport to Utah or Mr. Arguello's
unfortunate mishap after the machine arrived here.

Therefore,

no legitimate basis exists to subject IWM Co. to the exercise
of this state's personal jurisdiction and the ruling of the
trial court should be affirmed.
DATED this
l>
is jS

cday of May, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Douglas^ B. Thomas
Attorneys for Appellee
24 04 Washington Boulevard,
Suite 900
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 394-5783
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAUL ARGUELLO,

)

AFFIDAVIT OF GAIL Y. CROMEENS

PLAINTIFF,
VS

r*
* 1X)f\
ftpfc -. P hi)

•

INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING
MACHINE CO., INC.,

Civil No.

900900492P1

(Judge David E. Roth)
STATE OF TEXAS

)
:

COUNTY OF

ss.

)
GAIL Y. CROMEENS, being first duly sworn, deposes and

says:
1.
age

of

I am a resident of the State of Texas, am over the

eighteen

(18)

and

otherwise

competent

to

make

this

of

Industrial

affidavit.
2.

I

am

Executive

Vice

President

Woodworking Machine Co., Inc. ("the Company11) located in Garland,
Texas.

I have been employed at the company in the time periods

between 1974 through 1980 and 1985 through the present.

1

3.

I have thoroughly reviewed the company's records

regarding the company's sales for the last nine years, including
all sales made to customers in Utah during that time period. These
records indicate that the company has had an average of $13,153.00
sales to Utah customers in each of the last nine years, a figure
that represents approximately three-tenths of one percent (0.3%)
of the Company's total sale volume.
4.

The products sold to Utah during the last nine (9)

years consist almost exclusively of parts, rather than eguipment
or machinery.

These parts were sold to Utah customers that

telephoned in their orders to the Company's Texas location. On two
occasions a Utah sales person contacted the Company to purchase a
single chop saw (unrelated to a finger joint machine) that may have
been for resale. These are the only two instances that I am aware
of where the Company's products were purchased for resale in Utah
and these instances did not occur through any initiative of the
Company.
5.

I

have

also

reviewed

the

Company's

records

concerning advertising and sales calls for the last three years.
The Company has employed no sales people in Utah and no sales
representatives have been sent to Utah during this time period.
To my knowledge, the Company has never had a single employee that
was located in Utah.

Our records also show no contracts were

written in Utah during the last three years.
6.

The

Company

has

occasionally

placed

small

advertisements in as many as four trade publications during the
2

last three years that may or may not have reached Utah.

The

advertisements have not dealt with finger joint machinery similar
to the fingerjoint machine used by Weathershield.
7.

The company generally sells directly to customers

who use our parts or machinery.

I am unaware of sales to any

entity that has been distributing or reselling our products to Utah
customers.

To my knowledge, the Company has never utilized a

distribution network directed at Utah. The Company generally ships
its products directly to its customers by common carrier.
8.

I have reviewed the Company's records concerning

previous litigation and collection efforts.

The Company has no

record of any previous involvement in a court case in Utah or of
utilizing Utah's services and resources for debt collection or
other purposes.
9.

To my knowledge, my review of the Company's records

is representative of the Company's contacts with Utah since the
Company's inception.

I am unaware of any time period when the

Company's sales in Utah or contacts with Utah would have been
either numerically or proportionately greater than the time period
that I examined.
10.

I have examined the Company's records regarding the

sale of fingerjoint machine, Model 3470, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-410771.

This machine was made for and sold to Pickering Lumber

Company in Standard, California.

The machine was shipped to

Pickering on July 9, 1971, as indicated by the copy of the invoice

3

attached hereto as Exhibit "A". I am unaware how the machine came
into Weathershield's possession in Logan, Utah.
Generally, the Company has not sent service personnel to
perform maintenance or service on machinery in Utah.

However, in

July of 1982, Weathershield contacted the Company and requested it
to send a service representative to examine certain machinery in
Weathershield's possession in Utah that had been manufactured by
the Company.

One of the items examined was finger joint machine,

Model 3470, Serial No. 6-3470-Q-4-10771, that Weathershield had
somehow acquired.

This machine had been substantially modified

during the ten-year period

since

it had

left the Company's

possession. The service representative discovered that the biggest
problem with the machine involved the back-up lugs coming out of
square causing the wood to pop out. The machine had been modified
to use Zeigelmeyer lugs rather than the lug system that the Company
originally

provided.

The

service

representative

advised

Weathershield that the lug system needed to be reworked to hold
squareness on before the machine would perform properly.

The

service representative did not perform any service or work on the
machine and merely responded to Weathershield's inquiry concerning
the

operation

representative's

of

the

report

machine.
is

attached

A

copy
as

of

Exhibit

the

service

"B".

The

highlighted portion deals with the fingerjoint machine.

4
1n

To my knowledge, during the last nine years this is the
only occasion when the Company has sent a service representative
to Utah.

///
/

DATED this

day oofW^W!,
day
fCATZ^t., 1990

GAIL Y. tROMEENS

^

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / / ^

UM^J

'

199

day of

°*
NOTARY PUBLIC ^
Residing at: XJAAJO^C/.

<-

y
/XA/A.*/
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INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACHINE CO., INC
f. O. BOX 1444

GARLAND, TEXAS

SERVICE REPORT

0
July 29
«

19 £ 2 _

%

jT

* ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
f_

WEATHERSHIELD

6~M76$~'/-10 7 7/
"

Address

Logan, Utah

lines Serviced:
cc Performed:
7/20/82 -

Left NICOLAI at Springfield, Oregon 2;45 PM, drove to JEugene._ _
Took plane to Salt Lake City, arriving at 8:00 P M ^ Met^ by Bryan Jensen
and Jeff Smith.

Drove to Logan, Utah —

721/82 -

In plant at 7:00 AM.

__

Started checking ripsaw out —

arrived 11:30 PM.

found several electrical parts on the switch

console that were bad. Went over the principle of operation of the ripsaw
__

__

and the function with Bryan and Jeff and the operator.
Main problem seamed to be the electrical console, and synchronization not
working on the edger in relation to the rip blades.
shoot.

Started trying to trouble

Found a few sticky valves, and adjustment of new Servo

installed.

that was

Replaced a Skinner valve that actuates the Servo system, and it

did not work.

Thought there might be another problem —

could not find it —

went back to the new valve that was installed, and found that the new valve
was bad. Cleaned the old valve and replaced it —
then quit.

it worked a few times and

Bryan said they would get another valve and install the next day.

Suggested that they need to replace the switches on the console to get an
effective operation.
Met with Mike Anderson (over the finger jointing) and asked him wh?t kind of
problems they might be encountering there.
the back up lugs not staying square.

Said their b:i:gest problem was

These are Ziegelmeyer lugs, and he says

they square them from one to two times a day —
only run about an hour.

savs he can square them and

INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACHINE CO, INC
f. O. BOX U 6 6

GARLAND, TEXAS

SEBVICf REPOtT

July 29

19 _82_

WEATHERSHIELD

Address

Logan, UT

ics Serviced:

Performed: (7/21/82- continued)
Went over the alignment of the machinery.

Explained to them that they need

to get some lugs that they can hold squareness on.

If they do not want to

use ours, to rework Ziegelmeyers where they can hold them square.
They were running a slower feed on their 3550 due to lumber not being square,
because of back up lugs. _Also_catting short lengths due to this same problem.
Explained to them that if they would correct this, they could speed__the machine
up.

Mike says that they can feed the_nachine

f

aster, but they slow it down due

to the pop out problems caused by the out of scucre joints.

Ihey said that

thev would correct this.
*They questioned me about running 3/4 x 1-1/4 material on the assembly machine.
Said that when they tried to run this it was drooping
area, and also popping out in the squeeze.

down in the saw carriage

Explained to them how to set the

squeeze anvils, and that the glue would need to have some

tack

to it, and

get a good pre-squeeze in the roil section to run this,
Talked with John White, plant manager.

Explained to him what we had done, and

suggested that they need to spend the money on the ripsaw switch gangs to
correct the main problems they were naving out there,
The people 1 worked with at Weathershield were:
Bryan Jensen - Maintenance Supervisor
Jeff Smith - Cut, rip and yard foreman
Mike Anderson - finger joint lead man

INDUSTRIAL WOODWORKING MACH^f CO., INC
f. O. BOX 14**

GARIANO, TEXAS

SERVICE REPORT

!•

Jvly 29,

19 J2_

me

WEATHERSHIELD

Address Logan, UT

ichinet Serviced:

vice Performed: (7/21/82 - continued)
nppprted for Salt Lake Citv.

Arrived .Salt_Lake City at _6l30._ Could not

get a f l i g h t out of Salt Lake City until 10:00.

Departed Salt Lake City

at 10:00. arrived in Dallas at 6:15 Thursday morning.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Brief of Appellee to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this 15th day of May, 1991, to the following:
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and Martin W. Custen
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